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Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source 

of Inefficiency and Risk 

By John O. Bornhofen 
Over the past several years, a relatively new 
development has occurred on the American 
economic scene-the emergence of barter 
clubs and exchanges. In both clubs and 
exchanges, members swap goods and ser­
vices and receive "points" (credits) in return.' 
(Typically, each point is supposed to be worth 
one dollar in value.) 
The major reason for barter in modern-day 
industrial America appears to be avoiding 
taxes on income earned. Many barter parti­
cipants apparently believe that since barter 
transactions don't involve the exchange of 
money for services rendered or goods sold 
(traded), the (real) income obtained in the 
transaction is not taxable. This notion is, of 
course, incorrect. For instance, a gas station 
owner who swaps gasoline or auto repairs 
·th an electronics store owner for a new 
.,o cassette recorder is receiving income, 
it is real or in kind rather than in cash. The 
electronics store owner, likeWise, is receiving 
income in real terms. The value of the trans­
action is taxable to both. 
The thrust of this article is not about taxes, 
however. It is about barter as an economically 
defective way to conduct trade. Although 
barter clubs and exchanges reduce some of 
the disadvantages of straight barter, they 
create other problems, which I will discuss 
later. 
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Inefficiencies of Barter 
In a straight barter transaction, goods and 
services are traded for other goods and ser­
vices. That's simple enough. But people with 
goods and services to trade must find other 
people with whom to trade. Thus, someone 
who wishes to swap a stereo for a pair of skis 
must find someone who has the right pair of 
skis and wishes to trade them and wants a 
stereo of a particular kind. Such a person 
could be rare and hard to find. 
This need to find someone who has what 
we want and wants to trade for what we have 
is known as the "double coincidence of 
wants." The wants must coincide for a trade 
to take place. Finding this person could be a 
lengthy and costly process. Phone calls, ads, 
and time spent in search all add up to high 
transaction costs. 2 Even in the case of barter 
clubs and exchanges, the inefficiency is easily 
seen since they typically charge their members 
a percentage (often 10 percent) of the value 
of the transaction. 
Thus, barter is generally a very costly way 
to exchange goods and services. Using money 
as a medium of exchange is far more efficient. 
Since everyone accepts it, by definition the 
double coincidence of wants doesn't exist and 
the transaction costs are as low as possible. 
The Function of a Club 
The first function of a barter organization 
is to act as a clearing house for information 
about who has what to trade and (possibly) 
what the trader wants in return. By going to 
a central place with their wants, traders reduce 
their search costs. The exchanges often 
publish catalogues listing members and the 
goods and services they supply. Thus, the 
clubs reduce the costs of making barter trans­
actions. So far, so good, but modern barter 
organizations do more. 
Typically, they set up a system of deferred 
payments whereby a person can supply some 
good or service to another when the other has 
nothing Simultaneously to trade that the first 
person wants. For instance, through the orga­
nization, Mr. A, who has a bushel of potatoes 
to trade and wants a bottle of tequila, can 
supply the potatoes to someone who currently 
has no tequila to trade, or for that matter, has 
nothing whatsoever to trade (that interests A). 
Instead of getting goods and services imme­
diately, A gets "trade units" or "points" from 
the barter organization for the value of the 
potatoes. The units are then put into an 
account for A and can be used immediately 
to get goods and services from others, or they 
can be used later. This arrangement reduces 
the problem of the double coincidence of 
wants. 
However, there is the problem of deferred 
payments-payments of goods and services 
in the future. With any deferred payment, 
there is a question of whether the payment 
will actually be made. Will the persons mak­
ing the promises to pay actually be willing and 
able to carry them out when the time comes? 
The possibility that they will not is called 
"default risk." 
With regular money, default risk is mini­
mized through the high financial soundness, 
integrity, and reputation of the money issuers 
-typically the national government, the cen­
tral banks, and!or the depositing financial 
institutions, such as commercial banks. In the 
case of banks, there is the additional reduc­
tion in default risk through the use of deposit 
insurance. Thus, the default risk on the assets 
we use as money is as low as possible. 
In the case of barter exchanges, the 
exchange typically issues the trading units or 
points. It owes them, and the default risk is 
that it will not be willing or able to honor them. 
If the club or exchange were to fold or the 
operators leave town, members could be left 
with worthless points and be lacking the goods 
and services they supplied. Indeed, there 
have been recent reports of people having 
supplied major assets such as houses or land 
in exchange for points and not being able to 
use them. In less egregious Situations, peo­
ple have eventually been able to sell the points 
back to the exchange for money, but at big 
discounts. In another case, a barter organiza­
tion went bankrupt, and the operators 
reputedly started a new one allOWing mem­
bers in the bankrupt one to transfer units into 
the new one but at sizeable discounts. 
In addition, the possibility exists that the 
operators of the barter organization can ob­
tain goods and services for their own use and 
issue trading units on the group's behalf to the 
suppliers. The temptation must exist for 
operators to do this on a large scale and then 
abscond with the goods before the units can 
be used. The possibility that this can happen 
also means default risk to the holders of the 
units. 
continued on page 6 
Distinguished Speakers at Seidtnall 

Robert Lund, Senior Vice President of 
Marketing at General Motors, spoke to 
students, faculty, and staff Thursday, 
November 15. His topic was "The Leadership 
Role of the United States in Automotive 
Marketing." He also met over lunch that day 
with fifteen Seidman School Affiliates to 
discuss domestic automotive production and 
the Michigan economy. 
Dr. Steven Skancke, former Staff Director 
of the White House Conference on Produc­
tivity and Deputy Counselor to the Secretary 
of the Treasury, spoke to students, faculty, 
and staff Wednesday, December 5. His topic 
was "Profits and Productivity: Recipes for 
Success." He met with Seidman faculty at a 
luncheon to explore a number of productiv­
ity issues. Dr. Skancke is Vice President of G. 
Wilham Miller and Company. 
Dr. James Buchanan, Director of the 
Center for the Study of Public Choice at 
George Mason University, was in Grand 
Rapids and on campus on Thursday, April 
18. He spoke to west Michigan area econo­
mists at a breakfast meeting, to the Seidman 
School Affiliates at lunch, and to the Grand 
Valley students, faculty, and staff in the after­
noon. His topic at the luncheon meeting was 
"Federal Deficits and the Ethics of Default," 
and his speech on campus was entitled "Public 
Choice Perspectives and the Ethics of De­
fault." Dr. Buchanan's many publications 
include The Economics of Politics, The 
Calculus of Consent, and Fairness, Hope, 
and Justice. 
L. William Seidman, Dean of the School 
of Business at Arizona State University, spoke 
to students, faculty, and staff Thursday, April 
25. His topic was "Productivity and Quality 
in the United States." Mr. Seidman served as 
Economic Policy Coordinator for President 
Gerald R. Ford from 1973 to 1976 and as 
Executive Vice President for Phelps Dodge 
Corporation from 1976 to 1981. 
L. William Seidman 
Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source 

of Inefficiency and Risk 

continued from page 1 
These possibilities mean that additional 
costs might have to be incurred to reduce de­
fault risk. Potential members may have to in­
vestigate the exchange and its operators and 
their track records and credit standing. Thus, 
as transactions costs are lowered by reducing 
the double coincidence of wants, other costs 
and risks are higher. But, whatever the mix 
of costs incurred and risks taken, their total 
is higher with barter than with the use of con­
ventional money. 
It should be noted that the units or points 
produced by barter groups are an attempt to 
create another kind of money-an inferior 
one at that. The use of this "money" is limited 
to the members of the barter group, of course. 
It has no acceptability outside the group. 
In effect, barter organizations are an in­
between case, between straight barter, on the 
one hand, and the use of money, on the 
other. They issue a form of money but a 
limited one. 
Inefficiency in Supply
And Demand 
Another source of inefficiency with barter­
ing is that the prices at which trades take place 
are not necessarily equal to the "equilibrium" 
price. This occurs because of the limited 
market for bartered goods and services, 
whether that stems from the double coin­
cidence of wants or the limited number of 
trading partners in barter organizations. 
At this point, you will realize that even 
though goods and services may be bartered, 
they are traded at "prices." The price of a 
good or service in a trade is how much of 
something else is given up for it. A price is 
an "exchange ratio." For example, if three 
chickens are traded for one pig, the exchange 
ratio (the price) of pigs in terms of chickens 
is three, and the price of chicken in terms of 
pigs is one-third. 
The equilibrium price (Pe) at any particular 
time is the price. that balances the supply of 
the goods or services being traded with their 
demand. Consider widgets as the good be­
ing traded in a competitive market. Pe is the 
equilibrium price of widgets. At Pe , the 
number of Widgets demanders want is equal 
to the amount of widgets offered for sale. At 
Pe , there are no Widgets left over and there 
are no unsatisfied demanders who are will­
ing to pay Pe . Pe could be thought of as the 
"true" price of widgets. The higher the pro­
portion of transactions that take place at Pe, 
the more perfect the market. However, the 
more transactions that take place away from 
Pe , the more imperfect the market. 
In barter, the source of this market imper­
fection and inefficiency is the fact that markets 
for bartered goods are much smaller than 
those for the identical goods bought and sold•in regular markets with money Consider a 
combined market for widgets in which most 
are sold and a few are bartered. In a perfect 
market with efficient prices, the price of 
widgets throughout this combined market 
should be the same for identical widgets, 
regardless of whether the Widgets are traded 
for money or for other goods and services. 
However, because there are fewer trans­
actions in the sub market for bartered Widgets 
and fewer possible trading partners, the prices 
of bartered Widgets can be very different from 
those of widgets bought and sold for money. 
A person offering Widgets in the barter sub· 
market might get a lower exchange ratio 
(lower price) than would be the case in the 
monetary market. Similarly, someone 
needing Widgets might pay a higher price than 
in the regular market. In fact, it has been 
reported that some business suppliers of 
goods and services have vastly different prices 
for their products, one price for the regular 
market and another (much higher) for the 
barter market. 
There is no guarantee that the goods and 
services that people want will be supplied 
through the barter organization . Tremendous 
imbalances can occur between supply and .­
mand within the barter submarket, and th 
can allow transaction prices there to be co 
siderably different from the true prices. 
continued on page 7 
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In conclusion, resort to barter and barter 
organizations amounts to high transactions 
costs, inefficiency in the use of our scarce 
resources and increased risk, throughout the 
economic system. While barter organizations 
convey benefits, they also involve costs and 
risks that, at the macro level, outweigh the 
benefits. 
The root cause of all this appears to be high 
marginal tax rates on income. But even if 
trading through barter organizations is re­
corded, taxed, and reduced, individuals can 
still revert to straight barter, which is even 
more inefficient. 
I The difference between barter clubs and exchanges 
appears to be that the former are made up of 
individuals whereas business firms comprise the 
latter. Barter exchanges are sometimes called trade 
exchanges. 
2All costs represent what is given up to pursue one 
alternative rather than others. Costs are usually 
measured in money terms, but an out-of-pocket 
payment in money is not necessary for a cost to 
occur. 
'Not all barter transactions are taxable income­
producing transactions. Many are non-taxable 
because they involve personal (as opposed to 
capital) assets or personal expenditures. 
Dr. John O. Bornhofen is Professor of 
Economics and Finance and Chairman of the 
Finance Department in the Seidman School 
of Business. 
Seidman School ManagementMeMO 

The Seidman School Management Memo 
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.-he difference between transaction prices 
and the true, or equilibrium, prices could also 
distort resource allocation by giving off false 
signals about the values of goods and services 
traded. When scarce resources are misallo­
cated, and some other goods and services are 
forgone, there is waste. This waste is known 
as "allocational inefficiency." 
Avoiding Taxes 
One reason buyers might submit to these 
inferior prices is tax evasion. They might be 
willing to pay the higher prices if the percent­
age price differential is smaller than the tax 
rate and if the trades can be concealed from 
the tax man. Thus, people might be willing 
to pay up to 50 percent more for goods or 
services if their marginal tax rate is 50 percent. 
Barter organizations do reduce the original 
problems of double coincidence of wants and 
high transactions costs but substitute in their 
place default risk, an inferior type of money. 
But the basic inefficiency associated with 
barter still exists and causes a suboptimal 
allocation of scarce resources in the overall 
economy. 
Why then do we waste resources this way? 
To answer that. we must go back to tax eva­
sion. People are attempting to escape high 
rginal tax rates on income through the con­
_ 
.nUality of barter transactions. Presumably, 
e reduced tax load to an individual barterer 
offsets the additional transactions costs, in­
ferior prices, and/or default risk incurred. 
Even though this makes sense on the micro­
economic level. there is waste and inefficiency 
on the macro, or social, level. Costs are higher 
to conduct a given amount of production and 
trade through barter or barter organizations 
than with money. Resources used to carry out 
Economic Growth Resumes 
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is currently running at about $220 billion per 
year. The uncertainty is about when, which, 
and how much. Clearly the deficit will not go 
away-not with growth nor with any of the 
deficit reduction schemes being discussed in 
Washington. 
Outlook 
The outlook is for continual but erratic 
economic growth in 1985. Real GNP is 
expected to grow 3.5 to 4 percent. Unem­
ployment could fall a bil more, but thaI will 
happen much more gradually than in the past 
0 years. We should go below 7 percent. In­
ion may begin to creep up somewhat, but 
•	 I should remain at 5 percent or under 
throughout the first half of this year. 
barter and cope with increased default risk are 
resources that don't produce other goods and 
services. Thus, the economic well-being of 
people is reduced. 
Can Barter Be Eliminated? 
What can be done to rectify this misal­
location of scarce resources? There are several 
possible approaches. First, marginal tax rates 
could be reduced to make barter less appeal­
ing. However, it is unlikely that rates can or 
will be reduced enough to discourage this 
practice. Second, enhanced knowledge of the 
costs and risks of barter and barter clubs on 
the part of potential barterers would reduce 
some of the practice. If people have a general 
idea of the search costs involved in overcom­
ing the double coincidence of wants, the pos­
sibility of inferior prices, and the risk of default 
by other traders or barter clubs, the incidence 
of barter should be reduced. Barter will not 
be eliminated, however, as long as high 
marginal income tax rates exist. 
Third, having the authorities make sure 
they tax barter transactions that produce in­
come for the barterers would also reduce the 
incidence of barter and its attendant waste. 
In this regard, the IRS has recently required 
that each barter exchange report the gross 
transactions for each member on Form 
1099's. 
If barter clubs were required to record the 
name of each person who makes a trade, the 
type and amount of goods and services 
traded, and the amount of credits awarded 
in return, the value of the income-producing 
transactions could be determined. 3 This 
disclosure would be expected to raise the cost 
of operating the clubs and to reduce their 
attractiveness as tax-evasion devices. 
Although the near term looks rosy for the 
national economy, the situation for Michigan 
is more uncertain. While a buoyant economy 
will support an even more buoyant automo­
bile market, car production in Michigan will 
be held down as the Japanese increase the 
number of cars they sell in the U.S. market 
following our lifting of the "voluntary" import 
quotas on Japanese cars. While this will hurt 
the domestic auto industry and Michigan 
somewhat, it won't throw the state back into 
recession. And the American consumer will 
reap noticeable benefits. 
Dr. John O. Bornhofen is a Professor of 
Economics and Finance and Chairman of the 
Finance Department in the Seidman School 
of Business. 
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